Experts’ opinion on challenges and opportunities of tackling deforestation in the tropics: a Q-method application

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with our thanks to Emmy Bergsma, Joyeeta Gupta, Free University, NL
and international experts interviewed

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Share rate of deforestation 2000-2005

- Brasil: 27%
- Indonesia: 17%
- Sudan: 7%
- Other tropical countries: 24%
- Myanmar: 4%
- Zambia: 4%
- Tanzania: 4%
- Nigeria: 4%
- DR Congo: 3%
- Zimbabwe: 3%
- Venezuela: 3%

Source: FAO, 2005
Average annual deforestation rate, ha

Source: FAO, 2005
A brief history of REDD

COP-11 (Montreal, 2005): **Coalition of Rainforest (44) Nations** aimed to unite All to reduce emissions from deforestation (DF) and tackle climate change (CC) though community-driven sustainable economic growth.

Stern, 2006: Curbing DF is a **highly cost-effective way** of reducing GHG emissions and has the potential to offer **significant reductions fairly quickly**.

COP-13 (Bali, 2007) agreed on urgent actions to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Work towards data collection, emissions estimation, monitoring, institutions.

COP-15 (Copenhagen, 2009) aimed, yet not succeeded in reaching of a global binding CC agreement for long-term action from 2012.

COP 16 (Cancun, 2010) adopted the creation of **Green Climate Fund** with $100 Bln/yr by 2020 to assist poorer countries in financing GHG emission reductions and the adaptation to CC.

COP 17 (Durban, 2011) decided to adopt a universal legal agreement on climate change no later than 2015.
Flows of funds to host countries in support of CS projects of a REDD type

Countries - Donors
- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Japan
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Spain
- Switzerland
- UK
- USA

Funds
- UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Carbon Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
  - 112 millions USA $
- Forest Carbon Partnership Facilities
  - 250 millions USA $
- Forest Investment Programme
  - 558 millions USA $
- Congo Basin Forest Fund
  - 150 millions USA $
- Green Climate Fund
  - 100 millions USA $

Host Countries
- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Burkina Faso
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- El Salvador
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Gabon
- Ghana
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Honduras
- Indonesia
- Kenya
- Lao PDR
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Mexico
- Mozambique
- Nepal
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Papua New Guinea
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Republic of Congo
- Solomon Islands
- Suriname
- Tanzania
- Thailand
- Uganda
- Vanuatu
- Viet Nam
- Zambia
Distribution of donors-countries in funding of REDD

- Norway 82.5%
- Denmark 5.4%
- Other EU countries 9.2%
- Japan 2%
- Spain 0.9%

Source: FAO, 2005
Challenges

- **Additionality** – assurance that it wouldn’t occur anyway
- **Leakage** – avoiding displacing emissions elsewhere
- **Permanence** – keeping the C locked up
- **Monitoring** – degradation & deforestation
- ‘**Hot air**’ – surplus of cheap C credits flooding in
- **Baseline determination**
- **Uncertainties** and their quantification
- **Sovereignty** and various ethical considerations
- **Institutional/governance** issues
- Overall too high **transaction costs** anticipated
EU-FP7 Project
REDD-ALERT
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation through Alternative Landuses in Rainforests of the Tropics

- The James Hutton, United Kingdom
- Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Georg August University of Göttingen, Germany
- World Agroforestry Centre, Kenya
- Centre for International Forestry Research, Indonesia
- International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Nigeria
- Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical, Columbia
- Indonesian Soils Research Institute, Indonesia
- Research Centre for Forest Ecology and Environment, Vietnam
- Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le Développement, Cameroon
- Instituto Nacional de Investigacion y Extension Agraria, Peru
Aim and objectives of the module

- *Investigate expert perceptions on policy interventions to alleviate deforestation under REDD/REDD+.*

- Various *dimensions* are analysed, e.g. scope, fund raising/financing & costs, acceptability, effectiveness, policy instruments, institutional & governance aspects, feasibility/risks (e.g. permanence, leakages and additionality), monitoring/verification and co-benefits.

- A better understanding of heterogeneity of expert perceptions seeks to *provide insights into opportunities and challenges of REDD* and *have implications for the effectiveness, acceptability/liability of REDD-type intervention measures.*
Methodology

Q-Method (Stephenson, psychologist) is used which combines qualitative & quantitative tools (Brown, 1996).

**Focus:** anything that is difficult to quantify.

**Concern:** not with how many people believe such-and-such, but why & how people believe what they do.

Research starts with interviewing followed by Q-sorting. Then, employing correlation & factor analysis of the survey results, and in conjunction with concourse and discourse analysis, the *typologies of views* are revealed. We give then *social discourses* uncovered by the quantitative analysis, and contrast the value outputs with the *socio-economic background* of respondents.
Procedure

- Identify Research Scope & Objectives
- Literature Review
- Conduct Interviews
- Conduct Q-Sorts
- Results Validation & Verification
- Dissemination
- Concourse Analysis
- Value Elements
- Design Q-Statements
- Quantitative Q-Analysis
- Discourse Analysis
- Collection Q-Sorts
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1 - pragmatists</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Q-score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>41</strong> Unrealistically high expectation in communities about large money flows and high rents put REDD+ projects at risk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> To be most effective, avoided deforestation should target forests that are most under threat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> A global REDD+ scheme should be distinguished from CDM and exclude afforestation and reforestation project</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong> The match between international “willingness to pay” and national “willingness to play” is essential for the success of REDD+</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> In consideration of financial efficiency of REDD+, I support its integration in international carbon markets, with emission rights to be sold and profit used to avoid deforestation</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19</strong> The effectiveness of REDD+ heavily depends on policies to reduce forestry-products demand (like international import barriers and high taxes)</td>
<td>-5</td>
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<tr>
<th>Group 2 - defiant</th>
<th>Statements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>31</strong> “ Leakage” will not undermine the effectiveness of REDD+ scheme, e.g. because in the near future it will be well coped with</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>40</strong> REDD+ is about mitigating climate change and therefore should not obligate to achieve co-benefits (e.g. enhancement of biodiversity, improvement of local economy)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>21</strong> Community forest management projects cannot be standardized and therefore cannot be included under REDD+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>17</strong> The effects of introducing and enforcing proper forest management practice (as reduce impact logging, tackling forest fires and active forest regeneration) are difficult to monitor and should not be eligible under REDD+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> A global REDD+ scheme should be distinguished from CDM and exclude afforestation and reforestation project</td>
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<td><strong>4</strong> In consideration of financial efficiency of REDD+, I support its integration in international carbon markets, with emission rights to be sold and profit used to avoid deforestation</td>
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<td><strong>3</strong> To be most effective, avoided deforestation should target forests that are most under threat</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>27</strong> Anti-corruption policies limited to the forest sector will not work in countries with high corruption level</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>33</strong> Forest carbon stocks must be monitored regularly at national level</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>11</strong> Credits for REDD+ activities should be awarded at national level to ensure country’s support of REDD+ projects (e.g. in the form of supporting policies, legislation and financing)</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>26</strong> The match between international “willingness to pay” and national “willingness to play” is essential for the success of REDD+</td>
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<td><strong>13</strong> To make REDD+ workable, credible reference levels, reflecting what would have happened without REDD+ intervention, must be established</td>
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<tr>
<th>Group 3 - conventionalists</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong> The match between international “willingness to pay” and national “willingness to play” is essential for the success of REDD+</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>35</strong> Monitoring and control of carbon and financial flows substantially raise transaction costs without reducing the corruption</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>24</strong> Forest decentralization reforms will substantially improve REDD+ implementation</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>20</strong> Supply (production) side measures (e.g. concerning woodfuel production and plantation) must be priority for REDD+</td>
<td>-4</td>
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<th>Group 4 - optimists</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>8</strong> A multilevel find made up of voluntary donations from developed states should be available to finance REDD+ readiness, REDD+ implementation and loss compensation</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>30</strong> Liability for permanence should be allocated at those who receive the credits</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7</strong> Calculating the opportunities cost of renouncing deforestation – such as amount of compensation to be paid to a farmer who stop clearing forests – should form the basis for estimating the cost of reducing deforestation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong> The match between international “willingness to pay” and national “willingness to play” is essential for the success of REDD+</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>39</strong> Historically, economic development in the forested tropical countries has rested on deforestation. Therefore, by avoiding deforestation through REDD+ we retard their economic development</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> To be most effective, avoided deforestation should target forests that are most under threat</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22</strong> Incentives for individual villagers to include forest products and environmental services in land use decisions have a negligible effect on the effectiveness of REDD+</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>36</strong> Efficiency and equity in a global REDD+ policy are conflicting terms: both cannot be guaranteed simultaneously</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>21</strong> Community forest management projects cannot be standardized and therefore cannot be included under REDD+</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>23</strong> Equal burden sharing is insignificant for the acceptance of a global REDD+ mechanism</td>
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A brief description of the attitudinal groups identified*

- **Pragmatists**
  Back up the success of REDD/REDD+ and afforestation/reforestation, as well as the continuing raise of forest products markets. Financial efficiency of REDD+ is their main concern.

- **Defiants/Opponents/Sceptics**
  Disbelieve in REDD/REDD+, its main objectives, financial efficiency, monitoring and in the “play the game”, in sustainable forest management under REDD, particularly in involving the community forestry in the schemes.

- **Conventionalists**
  Support REDD+ ideas and believe in traditional, conservative ways of its implementation through good governance (primarily administrative regulation) and strong formal institutions.

- **Optimists**
  Demonstrate a complementary approach to REDD+ with the support of its components: from voluntary donations to conservation of biodiversity and ESS and the inclusion of community forests into the programme. Believe in equality and the sharing of burden of tackling both CC and deforestation.

*The names are highly indicative/symbolic and given to the identified typologies of views that exist in order to characterise the different perspectives. These names may be changed in the future. This research is ongoing.*
Based on distinguishing statements that belong to each set of key dimensions, the priority concerns as to REDD/REDD+ were identified for each attitudinal group.
An example of a comparison analysis of attitudinal groups

A global REDD+ scheme should be distinguished from CDM and exclude afforestation and reforestation project.

To be most effective, avoid deforestation should target forest that are most under the threat.

To make REDD+ workable, credible reference levels, reflecting what would have happened without REDD+ intervention, must be established.

In consideration of financial efficiency of REDD+, I support its integration in international carbon markets, with emission rights to be sold and profit used to avoid deforestation.

Community forest management projects cannot be standardized and therefore cannot be included under REDD+.

The match between international “willingness to pay” and national “willingness to play” is essential for the success of REDD+.

Pragmatists (group 1) and Defiants (group 2) are pragmatically opposed to REDD+.

Conventionalists (group 3) and Optimists (group 4) support REDD+.

Note: The diagram illustrates the different attitudes and their impacts on REDD+ implementation.
Distribution of respondents according to their gender and country of origin across the attitudinal groups identified.
Our pilot findings suggest:

There are various and diverse opinions about REDD/REDD+.

There is an interplay of the causes of deforestation, and that its drivers operate at different scales and are not easy to handle.

REDD policy decisions are shaped less by market signals and more by the distortions generated by international arrangements on the national, regional and the local level of governance.

REDD’s potential to mitigate CC is depends not only on international initiatives but to a large extent on national and regional policies and on local cultural values, communities’ objectives, those of businesses and on end-users’ acceptability of projects that affect the susceptibility to manage forests.

It is important, that international programmes are embodied in national and regional policies and provide multiple co-benefits and RD opportunities to local communities.

REDD initiatives to mitigate climate change through forestry require a long-term perspective to allow the involved parties to strengthen their belief in success of REDD+ intervention and develop capabilities in support of the measures.